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One of the contentious issues about the globalization process is the mechanism by 
which globalization affects poverty and inequality. This paper explores one of the 
various strands of the globalization–inequality–poverty nexus. Using microlevel survey 
data from over 300 poor households in the small village of Umuluwe (about 30 miles 
west of the regional capital of Owerri) in Southeast Nigeria, the paper investigates 
whether individuals who migrate from the village to take advantage of the urban-biased 
globalization process do better than non-migrant villagers. The paper concludes that  …/ 
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while the migrant villagers tend to earn slightly higher incomes than the non-migrant 
villagers, the poverty profiles of both categories of households are essentially the same. 
In other words, and contrary to conventional wisdom, globalization has not succeeded in 
alleviating poverty amongst the poor villagers who explicitly took advantage of the 
process. The paper argues that, by changing relative prices in the urban areas, structural 
adjustment appears to have eliminated any advantage that globalization may have 
bequeathed to the migrant villagers. 
 
   1
1 Introduction 
Globalization is a poorly understood phenomenon, especially with regard to its impact 
on the poor. Much of the academic discourse on the impact of globalization on 
developing countries has focused on macroeconomic issues like economic growth, 
employment, trade, foreign direct investment, and technology (see, for instance, Ajayi, 
2005; Abdel-Khalek and Korayem, 2002). Studies that focus on poverty issues have 
done so from a highly aggregated perspective, such as a comparison of the impact of 
globalization on developing and developed societies; poor and rich individuals, as well 
as between urban and rural areas (Ravallion, 2004). This macro approach has limited 
our knowledge about the impact of globalization on the poor. 
More uncertain, especially, is our knowledge of the channels through which 
globalization affects inequality and poverty. Although there are numerous theoretical 
frameworks for analyzing the globalization–growth–poverty nexus, there is a paucity of 
empirical evidence to support these frameworks. As Nissanke and Thorbecke (2007) 
point out, ‘despite the utmost importance of understanding the globalization–poverty–
nexus, the precise nature of the various mechanisms whereby the ongoing process of 
globalization has altered the pattern of income distribution and the conditions facing the 
world’s poor is yet to be carefully analyzed’. Perhaps more revealing is their contention 
that insights into globalization cannot be gained by regression studies per se, but by 
country-and-region-specific studies. 
This paper provides empirical evidence for one strand of the globalization–poverty 
trajectory, by investigating whether poor migrants who take advantage of the 
globalization process are better off than non-migrant villagers. Using microlevel survey 
data from over 300 households in the village of Umuluwe in Southeast Nigeria, the 
paper compares the poverty profiles of both the migrant and non-migrant villagers, in 
addition to their socio-economic characteristics. The results are somewhat startling: 
poor migrants who seek to take advantage of globalization do marginally better than 
their non-migrant counterparts. We speculate that globalization-induced changes in 
relative prices in the urban areas of Nigeria may have obliterated the benefits that 
migrants typically enjoy.1 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the 
driving forces behind the globalization process, while Section 3 describes the socio-
economic profile of the village of Umuluwe. Section 4 presents the paper’s 
methodology and empirical model. Results from the model are discussed in Section 5, 
and Section 6 contains the summary, conclusions, and policy recommendations of the 
paper.  
 
                                                 
1   This proposition, while briefly alluded to in the paper, is not explored fully because it would take us 
beyond the immediate focus of the paper, namely whether globalization-induced migration results in 
significantly better economic outcomes for poor migrants. However, an interesting area of further 
research would be one that explores the relationship between globalization-induced changes in relative 
prices and economic welfare.   2
2  A brief review of the driving forces behind the globalization process 
The globalization process is arguably one of the most contested phenomena of our time 
(Onyeonoru, 2003: 37). A cliché often used to describe globalization is that the world 
has become a ‘global village’ in which remote villages in far-flung countries now have 
unfettered access to technology, skills, foreign direct investment (FDI), and global 
commodity markets. In the words of Giddens, globalization involves ‘the intensification 
of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local 
happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa’ (1990: 64). 
Two major trends, however, characterize the current globalization process: the 
phenomenal growth in cross-border investment and international trade, coupled with the 
dramatic growth in global communications and technology (Sutherland 2002: 20). The 
flow of FDI, which amounted to US$160 billion in 1991, jumped to US$1.1 trillion in 
2000, the year prior to the study. The volume of international trade has increased 16-
fold over the past 50 years, with trade in spare-parts and other intermediate inputs 
growing faster than trade in final products (Sutherland 2002: 20). The other drivers of 
the globalization process include financial liberalization, internationalization of 
production, and the spread of market forces as the dominant mode of resource allocation 
(Abdel-Khalek and Korayem, 2002: 45–48).  
While there is consensus on the driving forces of the globalization process, considerable 
controversy exists about the impact of globalization on growth, poverty, and equity 
around the world. Some analysts argue that the poor have been made worse off by 
globalization, whereas others contend that the benefits have accrued disproportionately 
to the more affluent members of society (Wei 2002: 26). Because much of what we 
know about globalization is based on regional and country-level aggregate data, the 
impact of globalization on the village poor remains murky. In the next and subsequent 
sections, we describe the village of Umuluwe and explore the impact of the 
globalization process on the village. 
3  The village of Umuluwe, Nigeria 
The village of Umuluwe is situated within the predominantly Christian southeast region 
of Nigeria, and is about 30 miles west of the regional capital of Owerri and about 80 
miles from the capital Port Harcourt. Like most communities in Igboland, the Umuluwe 
people live in a close-knit village of about 3000 people. Except for interaction through 
marriages, the church, and trade with other neighboring villages, Umuluwe residents 
have limited contact with the outside world. For instance, the first contact with 
Caucasians for most of the villagers was when one of the authors and another colleague 
visited the village in spring 2001 (Gowdy, Iorgulescu, and Onyeiwu, 2003). 
Umuluwe is representative of rural Nigerian villages with difficult access from outside 
areas. The roads are quite a challenge for regular cars that, due to the pervasive poverty, 
are a luxury only very few can afford. There is no bus line, and people walk daily for 
hours back and forth to reach the nearby villages and the markets where their products 
are sold. As a consequence of inadequate infrastructure, people cannot commute to 
work outside the village. Electricity was introduced only in the last seven years. 
However, because of undersupply and transmission problems, a chronic problem in   3
Nigeria, power is on intermittently. The only water source is a small spring about one 
mile away from the center of the village. The soil has low fertility, and the absence of 
livestock makes agriculture unsustainable in a poor community unable to afford 
chemical fertilizers.  
All the indicators typically associated with globalization are absent in this village: 
diffusion of information and communication technology, high-paying jobs, and a rising 
standard of living.2 The village has no Internet access, and villagers must travel about 
50 miles and pay half of a day’s earnings to send an e-mail message. Per capita income 
in the village is about US$150 per annum, and the main sources of income are cash 
crops (palm trees and fruit), water and paving stone – the same sources of income it has 
relied on for at least the past five decades. Farming is mainly for subsistence, although 
surpluses are sometimes produced and sold at the weekly markets in neighboring 
villages (Onyeiwu, 1997). Proceeds from such surpluses are used to purchase such items 
as meat, milk, sugar, and bread. The villagers also use the proceeds to pay community 
dues, school fees for their children and healthcare.  
It would be naïve to discuss living conditions in the village of Umuluwe without 
discussing the development strategies adopted by the Nigerian government during the 
country’s post-independence era. Following its explicit commitment to economic 
development and self-reliance, the post-independence government adopted the Import-
Substitution Industrialization (ISI) strategy that focused on the promotion (through tariff 
protection, tax concessions, and other incentives) of ‘infant’ industrial enterprises. Apart 
from the expected foreign exchange savings from smaller imports of manufactured 
goods, ISI was also expected to create more jobs, transfer technology and skills to the 
local population, and help diversify the monocultural economy – an economy that had 
been encouraged by the colonial administration to produce and export cash crops (Ake, 
1981). 
However, ISI generated unanticipated backwash effects that undermined economic 
development in villages such as Umuluwe. For instance, the government sought to 
promote industrial development by transferring surpluses from the agricultural to the 
industrial sector. This was accomplished by the establishment of ‘marketing boards’ that 
set mandatory prices for cash crops, which resulted in the loss of income for farmers, 
particularly when world prices for those commodities were rising.3 At the same time, 
the prices of manufactured goods were rising, worsening the living conditions of rural 
dwellers in villages like Umuluwe and inducing them to migrate to urban areas. 
To attract foreign investors, the Nigerian government promoted infrastructural 
development in urban areas, and neglected rural communities. This partly explains why 
Umuluwe lacks the amenities mentioned earlier on. Additionally, the concentration of 
industrial enterprises in the urban areas meant that villagers could only find non-
agricultural jobs by migrating to urban areas – a process that led to the neglect of 
                                                 
2   Laptop computers donated to the village by one of the authors could not be used by the villagers to 
access the Internet because of the lack of telephone lines in the village. Seeing computers for the first 
time, the majority of the villagers were not familiar with how to use keyboards, let alone understand 
how to access the Internet. 
3   For details about the modes of surplus transfer from rural to urban areas, see Ake (1981).   4
agriculture and abandonment of the rural sector. We explore whether globalization has 
reversed or exacerbated this historical trend in subsequent sections of this paper. 
4  Methodology and empirical model  
The globalization process in Nigeria is driven by two interrelated forces: the 
implementation of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) in the mid 1980s, and the 
phenomenal increase in the flow of FDI in the 1990s and beyond. Globalization has 
resulted in the emergence of two categories of poor individuals in the village of 
Umuluwe. The first consists of individuals that migrated from the village to a small 
town named Obigbo within the suburbs of the large oil city of Port Harcourt along the 
Atlantic Ocean. These individuals began moving to Obigbo in the mid 1980s to 
diversify the large risks they faced as farmers in their village, and also to take advantage 
of the opportunities opened up by the globalization process in Port Harcourt.4 
Following Nigeria’s implementation of World Bank and IMF-inspired economic 
reforms in 1986, the country witnessed a huge inflow of FDI in the 1990s. The inflow of 
FDI in Nigeria rose phenomenally from a mere US$611 million in 1987, to about 
US$2.2 billion in 1996 (UNCTAD, 2005).5 Much of this inflow went into the oil sector, 
resulting in an unprecedented economic boom for Port Harcourt. The boom in the oil 
sector created opportunities in ancillary services such as welding, auto repairs, electrical 
repairs, driving, various forms of technical services, general supply, nursing, and 
clerical positions. Interviews of the villagers who moved to Obigbo show that they did 
so largely because farming as a major source of income seemed too unreliable. As 
Collier and Gunning (1999: 76) point out, ‘farmers face strikingly greater risks in Africa 
than elsewhere’. Globalization has thus opened up another avenue for the village poor to 
diversify their risks.6 
The second category of individuals consists of those individuals who remained in the 
village for various reasons (see next section), despite the economic opportunities 
available to them in the Port Harcourt area. Studies have shown that extremely poor 
individuals are often risk-averse, as a slight misadventure could be disastrous for them. 
Thus, they play it safe by sticking to their routines, unwilling to bear the risk of moving 
to a new cultural and economic environment rather than utilizing the opportunities 
created by globalization. 
                                                 
4   About 20 per cent of the estimated 3000 people in the village have moved to Obigbo. Although the 
move from Umuluwe to Obigbo is aimed at seizing the opportunities created by globalization, it is not 
intended as a permanent change of residence. The migrant households still own a residence in 
Umuluwe and return there on a regular basis. Some migrants even leave members of their immediate 
family behind in Umuluwe. In fact, there are daily bus shuttles between Obigbo and Umuluwe – 
something that did not exist before globalization. 
5   Nigeria is often regarded as one of the few African countries that received a large inflow of FDI in the 
1990s, although this inflow declined somewhat in the late 1990s and early 2000s, a following a global 
economic meltdown (Onyeiwu, 2004). However, by 2001, the inflow of FDI in Nigeria was double 
the levels of the 1980s. 
6   The use of globalization as a risk-pooling mechanism is evident because those individuals who moved 
to Obigbo to take up non-farming jobs continued to farm both in Obigbo and Umuluwe.   5
In May 2001, two of the authors visited the village of Umuluwe for about a week. One 
of our goals was to ascertain whether those villagers who migrated to Port Harcourt to 
utilize the opportunities created by globalization did better than those that stayed in the 
village.7 Assisted by four research assistants, socio-economic data was collected from 
over 300 individuals selected randomly from both the migrant and non-migrant 
individuals.8 Data were collected on income, savings, investment, assets, debt, 
remittances, occupation, education, apprenticeship training, gender, age, marital status, 
etc. Many of the individuals were also interviewed face-to-face to obtain descriptive 
information. 
Before proceeding to analyze the survey results, two limitations of the survey are worth 
pointing out. First, we noticed a tendency for some of the respondents to underreport 
their income and overestimate their liabilities.9 This underreporting is attributable to the 
individuals’ paternalistic view of the globalization process as a phenomenon geared 
toward supporting poor individuals in developing countries. Despite our repeated 
explanations of the survey’s objectives, some of the individuals believed that we were 
trying to identify low-income individuals that would receive aid money and other forms 
of assistance from international aid agencies. This view is not without merit, given the 
proliferation of ‘sister-village’ or ‘sister-city’ projects around the world.10 A second 
limitation of the dataset is the fact that poor individuals in Africa do not generally keep 
written records, and often tend to give rough estimates of their income, age, etc. Most of 
our respondents provided information based on memory, which sometimes can be 
unreliable – especially those dealing with quantitative information. Within the context 
of these limitations, we use the survey data to explore three hypotheses about the impact 
of globalization on the poor villagers of Umuluwe.  
5  Three hypotheses on the impact of globalization  
Given its contentious nature, it is problematic to make sweeping and axiomatic 
statements about globalization. Statements on globalization must necessarily be 
accompanied by caveats, contexts, and explicit assumptions. Based on the survey data 
collected from the village of Umuluwe, we propose the following hypotheses on the 
globalization process: 
                                                 
7   For our earlier publications on the village of Umuluwe, see Gowdy, Iorgulescu, and Onyeiwu (2003, 
2004). 
8   About 80 per cent of the respondents belonged to the non-migrant category, and the rest were 
migrants. With the help of a local research assistant, we were able to trace the migrant households to 
their location in Obigbo. We lived in the town of Obigbo for about one week. 
9   For instance, some of the respondents reported zero incomes, which seemed implausible to us. This 
underreporting was not, however, widespread. Since it occurred in relatively equal frequency in both 
categories of individuals, there was no systematic bias in the survey data. 
10  Sister-Village’ or ‘Sister-City’ projects are one of the fall-outs from the globalization process. These 
projects emerge when an institution, organization, a town, or a city in a developed country ‘adopts’ a 
village in a developing country. The relationship is typically paternalistic and unidirectional, in the 
sense that the developed country entity sends money, medicine, clothing, books, used computers, etc. 
to the ‘adopted’ village.   6
—Hypothesis One: There are socio-economic differences between migrant and non-
migrant villagers 
Much has been said about the need to take advantage of the globalization process, but 
less is known about the characteristics of poor individuals who are more likely to do so. 
As Stanley Fisher points out, ‘the right set of issues to raise about (globalization) is how 
best to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the growth and growing 
openness of the world economy; how best to live with the unavoidable difficulties that 
globalization may bring; and how to modify the system to make it operate better’.11 
Thus, identifying the characteristics of those who are more likely to take advantage of 
the globalization process enables policymakers to create an enabling environment for 
those characteristics to flourish – assuming they are endogenous. 
In this section, we use a logit model to explore whether differences in age, gender (a 
dummy variable with men assigned a value of one), education, and apprenticeship 
training are salient variables in predicting who among the poor is more prone to taking 
advantage of globalization. The logit model measures the propensity to migrate as a 
binary-choice dependent variable that assigns 1 to a migrant individual and zero to a 
non-migrant person. The standard notational form for the model is given as: 
ln [P/1-P] = αβX + μ     (1) 
where  P represents the value of the dependent variable between 0 and 1, while X 
represents a vector of the regressors, in this case age, gender, education, and 
apprenticeship training. Following Ramanathan (1992), both sides of the equation can 
be exponentiated before solving for P: 
P = 1/(1 + e
- 
αβX + μ)     (2)
  
In other words, the probability that an individual will migrate to take advantage of 
globalization is given by: 
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Following Maddala (1983), the marginal effect of a particular independent variable Xi 
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11  Remarks made at the France-Africa Summit, Yaoundé, Cameroon, 19 January 2001: 2.   7
The marginal effects represent the incremental change in the predicted probability 
caused by a unitary change in the independent variable under consideration. The 
marginal effects are used here to ascertain the relationship between an individual’s 
socio-economic characteristics and the probability of taking advantage of the 
globalization process. 
Table 1 summarizes results from the logit model, and it shows that education and 
gender are the only significant predictors of the propensity to migrate amongst the poor 
in Umuluwe. Specifically, individuals with more years of schooling are more likely to 
take advantage of the benefits of the globalization process, by about 12 per cent, than 
those with fewer years of education. Studies on rural-urban migration have consistently 
found education to be strongly correlated with migration (Barnum and Sabot, 1975), a 
correlation that can be explained by a number of factors. First, less educated people 
have much lower rates of return on work outside the village, thus making them less 
inclined to move elsewhere (World Bank, 1990: 33). Second, uneducated individuals 
have weak skills that confine them to low-end, village-based pursuits such as 
handicrafts, palm-wine tapping, palm-oil processing and odd jobs (World Bank, 1990: 
33). Third, education opens minds and makes people aware of the opportunities 
available to them, while illiteracy limits the ability of individuals to not only recognize 
the opportunities available to them, but also to take advantage of those opportunities. 
President John A. Kufuor of Ghana was right when he declared recently that ‘education, 




Table 1: Results from the binary-logit model 
Variable Coefficient  Std  Error  z-Statistic  Prob. 
CONSTANT -1.257  1.648 -0.763 0.446 
AGE  -0.038  0.070 -0.551 0.582 
AGESQ 0.0002  0.0007 0.409  0.682 
EDUC  0.117  0.049 2.409 0.016 
APP_TRAIN  -0.087  0.175 -0.499 0.618 
APP_TRAIN*EDUC -0.001  0.021 -0.067 0.947 
CHILDREN  -0.076  0.072 -1.063 0.288 
GENDER 1.396  0.392  3.567  0.0004 






                                                 
12  See The New York Times, 17 September 2005, p. A4.   8
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20–29 9  2  7  20  17  3 
30–39 14  6 8  26  25  1–2 
40–49  25 9 16  26  20 6 
50–59  22 8 14  15 9  6 
60–69  20 9 11 5  1  2 
70–79  7 4 3 5 3  1–2 
Over 80  3  3  ∼0 3  3  0 
TOTAL 100 41  59 100 78  22 
The positive sign of the coefficient on gender implies that men have a higher propensity 
to migrate than women, and thus have a higher propensity to take advantage of the 
globalization process. The low propensity of Umuluwe women to migrate is attributable 
to cultural constraints which, for instance, prohibit them from living alone in a different 
community or seeking opportunities elsewhere without the approval of their husbands 
(if married) or parents (if single). It is also known that African women bear a 
disproportionate burden of child-rearing, a burden that limits their ability to take 
advantage of the globalization process and other opportunities. One implication of this 
result is that there is gender bias in the globalization process; men are more likely to 
take advantage of the opportunity than women. This gender bias hypothesis is supported 
by the results in Table 2, which shows the gender distribution of migrant and non-
migrant individuals. While 78 per cent of the migrant individuals were men, only 22 per 
cent were women. The implications of this bias for gender inequality and the 
feminization of poverty are explored later in the paper. 
—Hypothesis Two: Individuals who migrate to take advantage of the globalization 
process tend to do better economically than non-migrant individuals.  
Analysts who claim that globalization has alleviated poverty often do so based on 
national or regional data, with little or no information on the conditions of the village 
poor. Because the majority of the poor in developing countries live in villages, it is 
crucial to assess the impact of globalization on poverty, using village-level data. 
We use the survey data to compute two standard measures of poverty in the village: the 
poverty headcount index and the poverty gap index. The poverty headcount index was 
calculated by finding the ratio of individuals who lived below the poverty line to all the 
individuals in the survey.13 The poverty gap index, which measures the severity of 
poverty, was computed by multiplying the headcount index by the ratio of the difference  
                                                 
13  We follow the conventional definition of the poverty line as an income of US$1 per day, which was 
equivalent to 100 Naira in the year 2000, the reference year for the income data collected for the 
village.   9
Table 3. Headcount Index for Umuluwe* and Africa** (%) 
 
< US$1  
per day 
< US$2  
per day 
< US$1  
per day 
(female) 
< US$2  
per day 
(female) 
< US$1  
per day 
(male) 
< US$2  
per day 
(male) 
Non-migrant 93.0  97.0 98.0 99.2 85.1 94.3 
Migrant 69.2  85.0  93.3 100.0 62.8  80.4 
Entire 
sample 
87.2 94.3 97.2 99.3 76.8 89.1 
Africa-rural  55.6       
Africa-urban  43.0       
Africa  52.3       
Sources: *Own calculations (based on 2000 income). ** Ali (2002:  12) 
Table 4: Poverty gap index in Umuluwe* and selected regions of the world** 
 1990  1999  2001 
East Asia  8.9  4.2  3.9 
South-East Asia  3.8  2.0  1.7 
South Asia  10.3  7.1  7.1 
North Africa  0.5  0.3  0.3 
SSA 19.5  18.6  20.5 
Umuluwe (Entire sample)  N/A  N/A  73.2 
Umuluwe (Non-migrant)  N/A  N/A  79.2 
Umuluwe (migrant)  N/A  N/A  54.4 
Sources: * Own calculation. ** UN (2004), quoted in Shimeles and Thoenen (2005: 4). 
between the poverty line and the average income of individuals in the sample living 
under the poverty line expressed as a proportion of the poverty line. Both indexes are 
reported in Tables 3 and 4. These tables illustrate the sobering extent of poverty in the 
village, with 87 per cent of all the respondents living below US$1 per day. An upward 
revision of the poverty line to US$2 per day increases the poverty rate amongst the 
respondents to a whopping 94 per cent. While sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has the 
‘highest incidence of extreme poverty and the greatest depth of poverty’ (Chen and 
Ravallion, 2004), the poverty rate in Umuluwe is shocking – even by African standards! 
It may well be that the poverty rate in African villages is underestimated by macrolevel 
data, a point poignantly made by Ravallion (2004). While the accuracy of using of using 
macrodata to measure the poverty rate may be debatable, it is clear that two decades of 
globalization have not reduced the overall poverty rate in Umuluwe. As Tables 3 and 4 
illustrate, both the poverty headcount and poverty gap indexes in Umuluwe exceed 
regional levels by very wide margins.    10
Perhaps more revealing is the fact that the migrant villagers did only slightly better than 
the rest of the villagers. As Tables 3 and 4 show both the headcount and poverty gap 
indexes are slightly lower for migrant individuals, indicating that globalization only 
marginally improved the economic condition of those who took advantage of the 
process.  Interestingly, these results can be used by those in the pro-globalization and 
anti-globalization camps to bolster their positions. For instance, one can make the case 
for the positive effects of globalization on the poor by pointing out that globalization did 
lift some of the villagers out of poverty. On the other hand, globalization detractors 
could point to the fact that the overall poverty rate in the village remains very high, 
despite the globalization process. This suggests that the globalization debate may not be 
resolved objectively, even in the presence of data.14 
Since globalization is often touted as a welfare-enhancing phenomenon, one wonders 
why it failed to significantly lift the migrating villagers out of poverty. Therefore, the 
underlying mechanisms within the globalization process that limit the ability of 
potential beneficiaries to extricate themselves from the shackles of poverty must be 
examined. As mentioned earlier, structural adjustment is one of two key drivers of the 
globalization process in Nigeria. While structural adjustment has promoted some 
macroeconomic stability in Nigeria, it has also caused economic hardships for the poor, 
particularly those in urban areas.15 A major component of structural adjustment in 
Nigeria is the removal of government subsidies on goods and services like fuel, 
imported food, education, health care, and transportation. To reduce government budget 
deficits, another key objective of adjustment, taxes were imposed on workers.16 The 
overarching effect of structural adjustment policies has been a change in the relative 
prices paid by urban dwellers for food, housing, transportation, education, health, etc. In 
describing the shifts in relative prices against urban dwellers, Kolb (undated: 14) 
observes that ‘SAPs have narrowed the rural-urban wage gap and shifted the balance of 
trade against the urban wage earner. Wage freezes in the context of currency 
devaluation mean that real wages are actually declining’. 
This change in relative prices has the effect of reducing the real incomes of the migrant 
villagers, making their economic welfare no better (in a significant sense) than the non-
migrant villagers.17 Easterly’s (2001) contention that structural adjustment makes it 
difficult for the poor to benefit from economic expansion (and in effect from 
globalization) further supports this claim.  
Although the poverty profiles of the migrant villagers are almost identical to those of 
the rest of the village, the former earn slightly higher incomes than the latter. To test this 
hypothesis, a multiple regression equation was fitted into the survey data, with income 
as the dependent variable. Although the determinants of the income of poor villagers are 
very complex, the following explanatory variables are used in the model: gender, age, 
                                                 
14  Because data on the globalization process can be interpreted to fit any preconceived notion, the debate 
on the impact of globalization may be a contrived exercise. 
15    See ‘Technical Proposal’ submitted by the National Centre for Economic Management and 
Administration (NCEMA) to the Global Development Network. The proposal is entitled: ‘Structural 
Adjustment Programme in Nigeria: Causes, Processes, and Outcomes’. 
16 Because of the weak tax-collection capacity of the Nigerian government, those in the informal sector 
(including the non-migrant villagers in Umuluwe) succeed in evading taxes. 
17 The non-migrant villagers do not face this problem, as they live in their homes, produce much of their 
own food, have no need for regular transportation, and demand very little education.   11
education, apprenticeship training, and a dummy variable that measures migration. The 
rationale for including these explanatory variables is as follows: 
Gender: Income can be influenced by gender, with men tending to earn higher income 
than women. Gender differences in earnings have been explained by a number of 
factors, including discrimination in the labour market and the fact that women tend to 
work part-time because of their child-bearing responsibilities. The coefficient on gender 
is expected to be positive, indicating that men earn more income. 
Age: The relationship between income and age can be represented by a quadratic 
function, implying that income increases with age up to a point and then begins to 
decline for very old people. To capture the declining effects of ‘old age’ on income, 
another variable (Age Squared) is included in the model. We expect the coefficient on 
Age to be positive and Age Squared to be negative. 
Education: There is a consensus in the literature that income varies with the number of 
years of schooling. Education is measured in this model by the number of years an 
individual spent attending primary, secondary, and post-secondary schools. The 
coefficient on Education is expected to be positive, implying that education has a 
positive affect on income. 
Apprenticeship Training: It imbues individuals with skills that enable them to earn 
income in both the formal and informal sectors of the economy. Thus, the coefficient on 
Apprenticeship Training is expected to be positive. Furthermore, individuals who 
combine years of schooling with this kind of training can be expected to earn even 
higher incomes than those with apprenticeship training alone. To determine the effects 
of this combination, we interact apprenticeship training with education, and expect its 
coefficient to be positive. 
Migration: As shown earlier, individuals who take advantage of globalization tend to be 
better off, as measured by the poverty headcount and poverty gap indexes, than non-
migrant individuals. We measure migration by a dummy variable that assigns 1 to 
migrant individuals and zero otherwise. The coefficient on the dummy variable is 
indeterminate a priori. However, a positive sign would indicate that, if the values of all 
the explanatory variables were the same for both the migrant and non-migrant 
individuals, the migrants would earn higher incomes than non-migrant villagers.   
The descriptive statistics and results from the OLS multiple regression are summarized 
in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. Education and Migration are the only significant 
variables that explain variations in income amongst the poor villagers in Umuluwe.18 
As expected, individuals with more years of schooling earn higher incomes than those 
with fewer years of education. More importantly, the positive sign of the coefficient on 
migration implies that migrants who take advantage of the globalization process earn 
higher incomes than non-migrant individuals, earning approximately US$200 more per 
year than a non-migrant individual.19 As mentioned previously, the village poor use the 
opportunities created by globalization to diversify their risks in the agricultural sector.  
                                                 
18  Both variables are significant at the 1 per cent level. Gender is significant, and with the correct sign, at 
the 15 per cent level. 
19  As stated earlier, 100 Naira = US$1 as of 2001 when the survey was undertaken.   12
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of variables in the OLS model 
  AGE APP EDUC  INC 
Mean 47.5  1.4  4.8  158.78 
Median 45.0  0.0  6.0  50 
Maximum 90.0  25.0  16.0  5000 
Minimum 18.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
Std Dev.  14.7  2.6 4.4  380.55 
Skewness 0.22  3.8  0.35  0.082 
 
Table 6: Results from OLS multiple regression 
Variable Coefficient  Std  Error  t-Statistics  Prob. 
CONSTANT -182520.42  23176.02 -0.799120 0.4249 
GENDER 7284.443  4978.242 1.463256 0.1446 
AGE 294.698  913.792  0.323500  0.7473 
EDUC 1731.341  681.3380  2.541089  0.0116 
APP_TRAIN 721.708  1681.060 0.429317 0.6680 
APP_TRAIN*EDUC 44.380  261.110 0.169966  0.8652 
PRO-MIGRANT 20742.15  5719.851 3.626344 0.0003 
AGESQ 1.121  9.0003  0.124551 0.9010 
Notes: Dependent variable: INCOME. Included observations: 272. Adjusted R
2: 0.13. 
Because individuals who take advantage of the globalization process earn higher 
incomes, risk pooling through globalization may be a source of economic growth. By 
contrast, the traditional strategies for risk-coping amongst poor African farmers – 
consumption smoothing and diversification of economic activities – are likely to reduce 
growth (Collier and Gunning, 1999: 78).  
—Hypothesis Three: Globalization promotes both income and gender inequality among 
the village poor. 
Analysts often extol the distributional impact of globalization, contending that it 
narrows the income gap between rich and poor worldwide (Dollar and Kraay, 2001: 16). 
But the distributional impact of globalization within poor villages has remained unclear. 
We explore the distributional impact of globalization on the poor villagers of Umuluwe 
by comparing the income, educational, and skill levels of the risk-taking and risk-averse 
individuals in the survey. Table 7 reveals a remarkable heterogeneity in the earning 
abilities of the migrant and non-migrant individuals. While about 56 per cent of the non-
migrant individuals earned less than US$100 per year, only 6 per cent of the migrant 
individuals earned less than this income level. Conversely, while 26 per cent of the 
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Over 500  6  5  1  26  21  5 
200– 7 4 3  18  15  3 
100– 16 11  5  14 12  1–2 
0.01–99.99  56 19 37  6  5 1–2 
0  15  2  13 36 25 11 
TOTAL  100 41  59 100 78  22 
 
 
Table 8: Comparison of education levels between the migrant and non-migrant individuals 
 
Table 9: Skill differences between migrant and non-migrant individuals 



















Non-paid occupations   69.8  29  71  36  59.3  40.7 
Farmer  66 30.1 69.9  24  44.4 55.6 
Student  0.4  0 100  2.7  100 0 
Applicant  0  0 0 8  100  0 
None 3.4  12.5  87.5  1.3  0  100 
















% males  
of TOTAL 
sample 
% females of 
TOTAL 
sample 
Tertiary 3  1  2  11  8  3 
Senior 13  7  6  31  29  1–2 
Junior 3  1  2  ⎯  ⎯  ⎯ 
Primary  37  19 18 43 34  9 
No  education  44  13 31 15  7  8 
TOTAL 100  41  59  100  78  22   14
Paid  occupations  30.2  70 30 64  91.7  8.3 
Trade  8.2 52.6 47.4 26.7  90  10 
Driver/transportation 1.3  100 0  8 100 0 
Business  2.1  100 0 6.7  100 0 
Technical  occupation  4.2  100 0 13.3  100 0 
Construction-related 2.2  100 0 1.3  100 0 
Retired  0.9  100  0 0 0 0 
Other 11.1  53.8  46.2 8 66.7  33.3 
TOTAL 100  41.4  58.6  100  80  20 
 
migrant individuals earned over US$500 per year, less than 6 per cent of the non-
individuals earned this amount. The income differences between these two categories of 
individuals partly reflect differences in their educational attainments.20 
Table 8 shows that educational attainment varies dramatically between these two 
categories of individuals, with 44 per cent of the non-migrant individuals reporting no 
education at all, while only 15 per cent of the migrant individuals reported no education. 
The higher level of educational attainment among the migrant individuals may be 
attributed to the fact that globalization spurs investment in human capital and skills. It 
may well be that the villagers are aware that they cannot possibly thrive in Obigbo 
without education and skills. This view, though conjectural and speculative, is 
supported by the superior skill sets of the migrant households. Table 9 shows that there 
are more migrant individuals in non-farm and skill-intensive occupations like trade, 
driving/transportation, business, technical occupations, and construction-related 
occupations. For instance, only 24 per cent of the migrant individuals were engaged in 
farming, compared to 66 per cent for the non-migrant individuals. This result should not 
be surprising because most of the jobs created by the large inflow of oil-related FDI in 
the Port Harcourt area require basic skills and education beyond those that are sufficient 
for a village economy. 
Gender inequality also appears to be one of the by-products of the globalization process 
in Umuluwe. As shown previously, men are more likely to take advantage of the 
globalization process than women. Since those who take advantage of the process earn 
higher incomes than non-migrant individuals, it means that the incomes of Umuluwe 
women will lag behind those of men. Data from the survey indeed show that this is the 
                                                 
20  Income remittances from the risk-taking households have also become a significant source of income 
for Umuluwe. An increasing number of Umuluwe residents now depend on remittances from their 
relatives in Obigbo. Thus, by creating windows of opportunities for risk-bearing households, 
globalization helps provide economic vitality to an entire village.   15
case. For instance, Table 3 shows that the poverty headcount index is higher for women 
than it is for men. This result suggests that globalization might be exacerbating the 
feminization of poverty in the village, a phenomenon that has become pervasive in 
many African countries.  
Poverty in Africa is increasingly feminized because of the rising number of female-
headed households, which has been estimated at about 45 per cent of all households on 
the continent. In Umuluwe itself, over half of the women are widowed – a result of the 
rapid decline in the life expectancy of men during the past 20 years or so. Female-
headed households, especially those with very young children, do not have access to 
productive resources because African culture precludes women from land ownership. 
Table 2 shows that most of the risk-taking women are aged 40–59, suggesting that these 
are widowed individuals who had no choice but to move from the village to explore the 
opportunities provided by the globalization process. 
6  Summary, conclusions, and policy recommendations 
This paper has shown that globalization creates winners and losers among the poor. 
Migrant villagers that are willing to take advantage of globalization have benefited from 
the process, though not as much as one would expect. Conversely, non-migrant villagers 
fail to take advantage of the globalization process continue to live in abject poverty, as 
manifested in very high head-count and poverty gap indexes. Village women, in 
particular, have benefited less from the globalization process. Thus, globalization 
creates both income and gender inequality among the village poor. 
Rather than treating the poor as a homogenous group, policymakers should identify 
those poor households that are unlikely to benefit from, or even be hurt by, the 
globalization process. These include women and uneducated individuals. To prevent the 
widening of the income gap between migrant and non-migrant villagers, policies should 
be focused on how to promote and stimulate economic activity at the village level. 
Government and development agencies should focus on projects that favour women 
because they appear to have been disfavoured by the globalization process. To head off 
the increasing feminization of poverty in Africa, women should be given a priority in 
the allocation of economic development resources. 
One of the implications of the paper is that the benefits of globalization do not accrue 
passively and automatically to the poor. The poor must be proactive and adventurous in 
order to take advantage of the opportunities created by globalization. Also, the fact that 
poor households have to move from their villages in order to internalize the benefits of 
globalization implies that the gains from globalization have not been equitably 
distributed among the various regions of Nigeria. This is very problematic, as the quest 
for the villagers to reap the benefits of globalization through migration may deprive the 
village of human capital that is essential for local economic development. The quest to 
take advantage of the globalization process outside of the village also weakens village 
institutions by disrupting social interactions and norms. For globalization to benefit the 
village poor, it must promote economic activities and generate economic opportunities 
within the village.    16
Finally, withdrawal of government subsidies on social services hurts the village poor 
and makes them worse off in the globalization process. Poor villagers are unable to 
invest adequately in resources that enhance their ability to produce because their 
disposable income has been whittled down now that they are responsible for social 
services that were previously provided by the government. 
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